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International Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime: New Challenges in the Twenty-first Century

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

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I. Introduction

1. The present document examines some of the realistic and imaginary fears related to transnational organized crime today. It is a discussion paper, in the sense that some issues are identified, questions are posed and controversies are highlighted, but no final solutions are provided.

2. Some definitions of transnational organized crime are presented in chapter II, and the concerns surrounding the growth of this type of crime are described and critiqued in chapter III. Some controversial issues arising from research follow in chapter IV, and the points for discussion in chapter V provide food for thought.

3. In its resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to elaborate an international convention against transnational organized crime and to discuss international instruments addressing trafficking in women and children, combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, and illegal trafficking in and transporting of migrants. The Ad Hoc Committee began its work in 1999 and is expected to complete it by the end of 2000. Because the Convention is an instrument to promote international cooperation in dealing with one aspect of transnational crime, namely transnational organized crime, a section on the implementation of the Convention and its protocols has also been included in the present document (chapter VI).

II. Concepts and definitions

4. A number of crucial elements need to be carefully examined if a definition of transnational organized crime is to be attempted. The following standard definition, which was used in the report on the results of the Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, could apply to a variety of cases: "offences, whose inception, perpetration and/or direct effect or indirect effects involved more than one country" (A/CONF.169/15/Add.1, para. 9).

5. Transnational crime, however, is a broad concept covering different offences that mainly fall, at times simultaneously, in the domain of organized crime, corporate crime, professional crime and political crime. In analytical terms, distinctions between these types of crimes appear to be easy to draw. For example, it can be suggested that organized crime is normally carried out by illegal enterprises, whereas corporate crime can be identified with illegal behaviour adopted by legitimate companies to reduce cost and maximize profits.[1] It could also be argued that, while professional criminals generally refrain from intimidation and violence against official authorities, members of organized crime are both inclined and able to use intimidation and violence.[2] It is also true that terrorist groups engaged in racketeering have different features than those of more conventional criminal organizations, a major feature being the different goals they pursue. However, these distinctions do not alter the fact that it is extremely difficult to draw precise definitional boundaries between organized and corporate crime.[3]

6. Controversies may arise when attention focuses on the adjective "transnational", which implies that the types of crime under discussion always and solely take place across borders. This is not always the case. Most illegal markets are an example. Illicit goods are produced locally, and only their distribution takes place internationally. Another example is trafficking in human beings, where illegal migrants are recruited at specific locations and only the trafficking operations take on an international character. Moreover, many conventional organized groups owe their international power to the resources they accumulate in their specific local context.

III. Concerns

7. Official concerns about transnational crime appear to be centred on the feeling of vulnerability that developed countries harbour towards criminal activity originating in other countries. This manifests itself through fears that illicit goods, more dangerous than any of those produced by developed countries, may destroy the citizens and institutions of the civilized world.

8. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of the main contemporary manifestations of transnational crime. Little empirical research is available, and existing studies focus mainly on the national and local impact of transnational crime. The United Nations through its global studies on transnational organized crime, is trying to fill this gap.

9. Transnational organized crime should not be exclusively identified with the illegal activities of organizations such as the Italian Mafia, Russian organized crime syndicates, the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza, the Colombian cartels or the Nigerian networks.[4] These criminal organizations may perhaps constitute the most

powerful groups engaged in transnational criminal activities, but they are far from monopolizing such activities. Similarly, attention should not be focused solely on conventional activities such as the drug trade, trafficking in human beings or stolen goods and the laundering of illegal proceeds. Transnational crime may well transcend such conventional activities and take on more complex features. It may, for example, mingle with entrepreneurial and, at times, governmental deviance. This occurs when legally produced goods are illegally marketed, as in the case of smuggling nuclear material, armaments, pharmaceutical products, tobacco, alcohol, food and so on. This also occurs when the illegal marketing of goods produced in one country is supported by the complicity of corrupt politicians in a country in which those goods are officially banned.

10. Transnational organized crime includes tax evasion, the forgery of clothes and electronic equipment, fraud against international financial institutions, unfair competition on international markets, industrial espionage, the import and export of protected plants and animals, trafficking in works of art and the illegal dumping of toxic industrial waste. It also involves not only illegal activities by terrorist groups or organizations but also the violation of sanctions and embargoes imposed on countries by the international community and includes aggression against countries in the form of war and genocide.

11. Most transnational criminal activity is accompanied by such illegal acts as the corruption of officials, which facilitates both the commission of an offence and its concealment, and money-laundering, through banking institutions or off-shore agencies. A final concern is that perpetrators of transnational organized crime are willing and able, as necessary, to use violence for the pursuit of their interests.

IV. Controversial issues

12. In the past few decades, the transnationalization of criminal activity has increased substantially. The increase is due not only to the geographical distance over which crimes are committed but also to the frequency with which criminals operate across regional and national borders. This development is not taking place in isolation but is part of the general process of globalization.

13. Economic interdependence and the increase in international economic exchange make the transfer of goods and the movement of people across borders easier. Illegal traffickers take advantage of these developments using parallel or overlapping commercial routes. This may explain why so many groups that are involved in transnational criminal activity own transport firms and/or import-export businesses.

14. Causes of crime are always hard to establish, although some remarks on transnational organized crime can be attempted. It could be tentatively suggested that many types of transnational crime are caused by:

(a) The great economic disparity existing in the world. One consequence of that disparity is that, in many countries, large sections of the population are lured into producing illegal goods. Many people are also vulnerable to physical exploitation, for example in the form of prostitution, by criminal organizations. Moreover, poor countries offer attractive markets for goods that are stolen in more affluent ones. Simultaneously, advanced countries, owing to high production costs and/or high taxes, often expand the hidden sectors of their economy and employ cheap unregistered workers;

(b) Political conflicts erupting in many countries and regions, which generate widespread violence and encourage trafficking in human beings and illegal arms. Countries at war may have a financial interest in other forms of crime, such as the illegal import of arms. In doing so, they establish illicit partnerships with other countries.

15. Hence, one controversial issue is the extent to which more economically advanced countries foster transnational crime. For example, in respect of illicit drugs, many officials in developed consuming countries are prone to attribute responsibilities to producing countries and fail to consider how a pre-existing pharmacological culture allowed illicit drug use to develop. They also overlook the demand side of the equation, focused as they are and on the assumption that proceeds generated by illicit drugs are only appropriated by foreign producers and large distributors. They thus consider the considerable revenues generated by illicit drugs within the consuming countries themselves.

16. A second controversial issue is that transnational organized crime is seen by many officials to be the result of the growing numbers and variety of individuals and groups reaching more economically advanced countries. Since such individuals and groups arrive from places scattered around the world, and often from countries in transition or in turmoil, they are perceived as being difficult to control and impervious to integration. The

newcomers are said to bring with them their social and commercial networks, which make law enforcement difficult and, at the same time, facilitate "conspiracy".[5] No attention is given to similar difficulties encountered by law enforcers prior to the arrival of migrants and to the commercial "conspiracy" that already features in host countries long before they are "invaded" by aliens. In other words, the fact that migrants find in the host countries the social and institutional environment that makes their illicit enterprises possible is normally deemed unworthy of any analytical effort.

17. Some definitions of transnational crime imply a notion of ethnic succession. According to this notion, certain national cultures and groups are expected to climb the crime ladder and eventually occupy a prominent position in illegal markets. Official classifications of organized crime, for example, have often been inspired by ethnic qualifications and categories.

18. Criminological analysis has long disputed the "ethnicity trap",[6] both because of the large number of ethnic groups involved in transnational organized crime and because of the interaction in which they engage in criminal business. Given the increasing social, geographical and inter-cultural mobility, ethnicity may be seen less as a causal or facilitating factor than mobility itself.

19. More attention should be given to analysing how geographical, social and cultural mobility may facilitate criminal undertakings. More specifically, analysis should focus on how criminal activity conducted by aliens needs a receptive environment, along with a range of indigenous partners and agents, in the countries in which criminal activities are carried out. Many officials are concerned that, because migrant communities or groups of ethnic settlers are marginalized, they are believed to support the criminal enterprises run by their compatriots. This belief should be challenged, and the facile equation migrants plus marginalization equal crime should be severely criticized. In this respect, a different issue could be explored, namely that ethnic minority groups, in order to develop criminal entrepreneurship, need partners among the indigenous groups of the very host society marginalizing them. Partnerships with legitimate entrepreneurs of the host country, moreover, may offer larger guarantees that, along with official commercial consortia, effective smuggling lines are also set up.

20. The investment of illegitimate proceeds in economically advanced countries raises other controversial issues. Some studies indicate that criminal groups are slowly abandoning their involvement in visible economic activities and are diverting criminal profits towards the more secretive financial sector.[7] This diversion is said to make detection more difficult and the confiscation of assets problematic. The entry of transnational criminal operators in the financial world is believed to herald potential disruption, distortion of rules, erosion of ethics and suppression of competition; ultimately, it is assumed to foster a "purge" among entrepreneurs, leading to the survival of those more criminally fit. Some arguments behind this belief are given below.

21. Organized criminal groups have been charged with upsetting the harmonious relationship between demand and supply. By making illicit goods available, for example, they are said to reduce the aggregate demand for licit goods in the market and consequently to limit the revenues of the legitimate companies producing and distributing them. This argument implicitly rules out the possibility that criminal proceeds may be used to acquire licit goods, although there is no evidence that members of organized crime groups are more restrained spenders than ordinary consumers. It has also been argued, however, that organized criminal groups have a low propensity for consumption because their illicit income continues to circulate within criminal markets to finance subsequent illicit initiatives. It has also been claimed that criminals tend to transfer abroad parts of their earnings, thus depriving the country in which they operate of substantial funds.

22. Yet another controversial issue emerges here, because these are hardly specific characteristics of organized crime. Legitimate entrepreneurs also accumulate inert wealth and may fail to translate all their earnings into dynamic investment or consumption. Some legitimate entrepreneurs and politicians may also transfer money abroad, and, despite the existence of permissive rules legally allowing them to move their capital across borders, they find ways of increasing the sums moved by resorting to illegal practices. It is worth pointing out, in this respect, that so-called "hot money", which is commonly and almost automatically associated with criminal proceeds being laundered, in fact includes money earned, legitimately or otherwise, by official actors.[8] Monies that are used for or accumulated through tax evasion, bribes, flight capital, illicit transactions in licit goods (such as arms transfers) and the illegal funding of political parties are examples of "hot money", as is money loaned to developing countries that is furtively invested in the developed world that gave

the loan. Credible estimates suggest that the proportion of money laundered by organized crime only constitutes around 10 per cent of the overall amount of "hot money".[7, 9, 10]

23. It is controversial whether organized criminal groups teach or learn from deviant entrepreneurs and politicians. It could be argued, for example, that transnational criminal groups that invest illicit proceeds in the official economy have learned from the techniques and the rationalizations of white-collar and corporate offenders, thus being, in a sense, corrupted by the economy rather than corrupting it.

24. Descriptions that characterize members of organized criminal groups as being too visibly different or perhaps too culturally and linguistically different, to become accepted in the business world do not consider how acceptance in that world is mediated by individuals and groups who act as go-betweens. The investment of criminal proceeds in the financial market, for example, forces organized crime to open up to, and establish connections with, mediators and agents who make *pecunia non olet* (money does not smell) their favourite motto.

25. In brief, the encounter between transnational organized crime and the official economy is not the result of an unnatural relationship between a harmonious entity and a dysfunctional one. Rather, it amounts to a joint undertaking of two loosely regulated worlds, both deviating from the rules they officially establish for themselves. For example, the rules of fair competition are often disregarded by those very legitimate entrepreneurs who claim their universal validity and, similarly, the "rules of honour" are ignored by criminal entrepreneurs who claim their unconditional faith in them.[11]

V. Points for discussion

26. In this chapter, a number of examples are given in an attempt to prove that the intermingling of organized, corporate and white-collar crime constitutes a specific feature of transnational illegal organizations. Some remarks accompanying the examples given are intended to provide points of discussion and some food for thought.

27. Among the illegal activities conducted by transnational organized crime, as already mentioned, those associated with the trafficking in human beings are paramount. In this respect, some authors appear to assume that this activity is carried out by structured enterprises engaged in specialistic, long-term undertakings. Related to this assumption is the implicit association of this type of activity with organized crime, therefore conveying the notion that those engaged are full-time criminal entrepreneurs who have developed expertise and accumulated resources in previous illegal activities. Other authors, instead, suggest that many of those involved in trafficking in human beings have no previous criminal record. Cases that have come to public attention suggest that the second proposition is as close to reality as the first. Enterprises involved in trafficking often derive their skills and expertise from the licit arena of business in which they operate. Travel agencies are involved, along with transport companies, at times in connection with informal employment agencies. Usually, none of the staff of such agencies and companies has a criminal record much less a link to organized crime. While committing offences that organized criminal groups also commit, companies may become partners of the latter, without sharing their overall culture and strategies. To define such companies as transnational organized crime adds to the definitional chaos that already characterizes this type of crime. Thought should, therefore, be given to the identification of more nuanced definitions.

28. Transnational organized crime should not be mistaken for activity conducted by centralized, highly structured organizations and ruthless market operators. Dispersed participants and diverse social actors are involved in networks in which opportunistic chances are taken and short-term alliances are set up.[12]

29. According to some studies, traffickers frequently maintain control of illegal migrants once they reach the country of destination and force those trafficked to commit crime, engage in prostitution or work for low wages,[13] although it has also been argued that girls and women are recruited in their home country and are promised jobs abroad but are later forced into prostitution. Studies have also shown that illegal migrants who use the services of traffickers experience debt bondage and that, in addition to transportation, smugglers charge exorbitant rents for substandard, abandoned or even condemned housing, and that debts force immigrants to work in sweatshops.[5]

30. It is inappropriate to portray such illicit business as one exclusively characterized by a victimizer-victimized relationship. Thought should be given to the fact that there are both willing and unwilling victims, and that the very concept of trafficking should be properly unravelled if other dynamics are to be brought to light. According to the International Organization for Migration, for example,

many women illegally entering developed countries are fully aware of the type of job for which they are destined. They often know, for example, that their work in the host country will be in the sex industry. Some choose to pay a fee to traffickers who, in this context, could be more appropriately described as "illegal migration operators". Some of the women plan to stay in the host country for a number of years and return home with sufficient money to start a business. Upon returning, these women may display their newly acquired economic status, describe the easy ways in which money can be earned and talk about the tolerance of the police and the enthusiasm of customers. Sometimes, they may end up encouraging other women to follow their example, therefore acting as facilitators or, indeed, as "migration operators" themselves.[14]

31. The conditions under which illegal migrants are forced to work would not seem to be attributable to traffickers, as responsibility for such conditions lies with the labour market in which migrants are employed. Some thought should be given to the increase in flexible and casual work that is observed in most developed countries. This increase has created a situation where workers with low social and economic expectations are highly desirable. Among these workers, illegal migrants seem to have a formidable advantage because, as soon as their expectations become higher, employers can report them to the police as illegal. Paying a fee to traffickers is part and parcel of this phenomenon, as migrants are taught that it is a privilege to enter an economically advanced country and, once there, they had better not ruin such a unique opportunity by demanding too much. In sum, trafficking in human beings could also be analysed within a demand-supply framework, as illegal migrants employed in the hidden economy, including the sex industry, meet a specific demand in economically advanced countries. More thought, therefore, should be given to the effects of a strict immigration policy, which may lower the expectations of migrants more than it limits their numbers.

32. Among the circumstances that generate official anxiety is the fact that members of transnational criminal groups take advantage of differences in legislation within a country, moving across countries with a view to exploiting normative loopholes and inconsistencies. Therefore "criminal groups spread into sectors where the risk of being arrested and heavily sentenced is relatively low, especially compared to the attractive economic return".[15] Responses are advocated that may reduce such normative inconsistencies while reducing the mobility of transnational organized groups. The creation of agreements between countries is among the most popular responses, accompanied by the establishment of joint working groups and cooperation between law enforcement agencies.

33. Thought should be given to the possibility that this type of response, which entails that police forces around the world coordinate their efforts, may contribute to the establishment of networks and practices and of technical and political alliances that escape democratic control of both States and the international community. Fear of the powerful threat posed by transnational organized crime, in sum, may be exploited with a view to cutting normative corners and eroding civil rights.[16]

34. Consideration should also be given to the fact that transnational organized crime traditionally creates demand for the smuggled goods it brings into markets. As an example, cigarette smuggling started in Mediterranean countries as early as the 1950s and contributed to the unpredicted success of certain cigarette brands and the decline of local tobacco products. The current smuggling of goods such as cars, clothes, computers and mobile phones in developing countries and countries with economies in transition may have the same effect, making those countries totally dependent upon products from and keen to adopt the lifestyles of developed countries.

35. There is widespread agreement that transnational organized crime is the result of new criminal opportunities. The nature and features of these opportunities deserve brief examination. According to a distinction suggested by Albanese,[17] there are opportunities that provide easy access to illicit earnings with relatively low risk, and there are opportunities created by offenders. The former include not only the provision of illicit goods and services that are in high demand but also opportunities that are the result of social and technological change. Opportunities created by offenders often involve bribery or extortion. Examples, in this case, include protection rackets and frauds involving otherwise legitimate business enterprises. However, some forms of transnational organized crime make this distinction extremely blurred, if not redundant. Transnational organizations seize easy opportunities and create new ones at the same time. Their modus operandi is such that criminal acts become increasingly interdependent and multifaceted.[15] Skills acquired in one field are utilized in new markets, while partnerships are established with a variety of actors, be they legitimate or otherwise. The movement from one activity to the other, crucially, entails an intermittent shift from areas that traditionally pertain to organized crime to areas that are the traditional preserve of

white-collar or corporate crime. In brief, transnational organized crime has some of the features of transnational white- collar crime, as in the case of legitimate corporations making bribery payments to foreign officials to facilitate the marketing of their goods in countries where those goods are banned.[18] More emphasis should be placed on the notion that transnational crime encapsulates this mixture of criminal conduct, which may be a reason for serious concern.

36. This leads to a final consideration. There is a widespread feeling that white-collar and corporate crime are less stigmatized and penalized than conventional organized crime. With the interconnection of these types of criminal behaviour, the relative tolerance normally accorded to white-collar criminals may be extended to members of conventional organized criminal groups.

37. Further research into the causes of the various types of transnational crime is vital. The effects of deterrence and penalization and the role of law enforcement should also be studied.

VI. Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocols thereto

38. In its resolution 54/125 of 17 December 1999, the General Assembly decided that the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders should devote particular attention to ways and means of making operational the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, especially taking into account the needs of developing countries in the area of capacity-building. In its resolution 54/126 of 17 December 1999, the Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to intensify its work in order to complete it in the year 2000. As a result of the satisfactory progress in the negotiations on the draft Convention and its draft Protocols, it is expected that the instruments will be adopted by the Millennium Assembly.

39. The draft Convention in its present form contains four articles related to its implementation. According to one of those articles, a Conference of the Parties to the Convention would be established to improve the capacity of States parties to implement the Convention. The Conference of the Parties would be charged with agreeing upon mechanisms to, *inter alia*, facilitate activities by States parties under the articles of the Convention dealing with technical cooperation, including by mobilizing voluntary contributions, and to review periodically the status of implementation of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties would be informed of the measures taken by States parties in implementing the Convention and of the difficulties encountered. Articles related to implementation also deal with the secretariat of the Conference of the Parties, training and technical assistance, and measures for the implementation of the Convention through economic development and technical assistance.

40. In view of the ground-breaking nature of the Convention and its three protocols, their implementation will pose significant challenges to States and the United Nations. Many States will need to put in place new or amend existing legislation, as well as to strengthen their law enforcement structures and criminal justice systems, in order to be able to comply with their obligations under the Convention and its protocols. On many occasions, such action will be required in order for the States to ratify or accede to the Convention and its protocols. For many States, legislating in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and its protocols will require expertise and know-how that may not be available domestically. Putting in place new or amending existing legislation may also require knowledge of the choices made by other States, as well as the experience gained by them, in drafting and implementing such legislation. Strengthening law enforcement structures and bringing about the necessary improvements on criminal justice systems will require the development of human resources, through training and the upgrading of skills, as well as the acquisition or modernization of equipment and the development or upgrading of facilities. Consequently, there will be a need to make available technical assistance at the earliest possible stage of the implementation process.

41. While some of this assistance might be provided at the bilateral or regional level, the United Nations will have a central role to play in fostering and sustaining implementation of the Convention and its protocols. Following the adoption of the Convention and its protocols, the Centre for International Crime Prevention will promote their signature and ratification, thereby ensuring the expeditious entry into force of the instruments. The Centre will need to provide advisory

services to assist States in preparing legislation required under the Convention. The Centre will also need to organize training courses and provide other forms of assistance to requesting States to support national efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of their law enforcement and criminal justice systems to comply with their treaty obligations. Following the entry into force of the Convention and its protocols, the Centre will need to develop a comprehensive technical cooperation programme to assist interested States in complying with the provisions of the new instruments and in putting those provisions into effect.

42. The Conference of the Parties is to be convened no later than one year after the entry into force of the Convention. The Centre for International Crime Prevention, as the secretariat of the Conference of the Parties, is to assist the Conference in fulfilling its functions.

43. To carry out the above-mentioned tasks, the Centre for International Crime Prevention will need to be strengthened. Additional resources should be allocated to the Centre to enable it to support States in their efforts to ratify the Convention and its protocols and implement the provisions of those instruments. In addition, the Centre will need to be provided with adequate resources to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out its work.

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Effective crime prevention: keeping pace with new developments

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I. Introduction

1. The modern State seeks protection from crime principally through the operations of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems. These "formal" systems of control serve the dual purpose of deterring law-breaking among the population at large and of apprehending, punishing and treating those who offend. Governments have tried to improve the effectiveness of those systems by such means as strengthening the police force, streamlining the judicial process, diverting less serious offenders from the system, increasing the severity of punishment for serious crimes and widening the range of penal treatments for recidivist offenders.

2. Complementing the formal system of control is what criminologists refer to as society's "informal" social controls. These include a panoply of measures taken by parents, schools and religious bodies to instil respect for the law among children and young people, to regulate the conduct of people as they go about their daily lives and to afford protection to persons and property through routine precautions and security measures.

3. The formal and informal systems of control depend upon each other for their effectiveness. Without informal social controls, the criminal justice system would soon be swamped with a multitude of crimes, both more and less serious, and would cease to function effectively. Equally, without the existence of the criminal justice system to impose the threat of arrest and punishment, informal social controls would face a constant challenge to their legitimacy and credibility.

4. As well as strengthening formal controls, Governments have tried to bolster informal controls through pronouncements about the duty of parents, schools, communities and other social institutions to promote the rule of law. More recently, as they have come to recognize the limitations of the formal system in controlling crime (and have had to meet its escalating costs), Governments have begun to explore more direct ways of improving informal social controls. Such activity falls under the general heading of "crime prevention", which covers a very wide range of possible actions.

5. Several detailed classifications of crime prevention have been developed by academic criminologists. However, policy discussions usually distinguish between just two kinds of prevention, social prevention and situational prevention, which correspond to the two main ways of preventing crime—reducing criminal motivation and reducing crime opportunities. For the purposes o present discussion it is useful to distinguish among different general approaches (three of which seek to re criminal motivation), which are distinguished by their set of objectives and techniques. These four approach crime prevention are:

(a) Child development. Research has docum a variety of risk factors in early childhood associated later delinquency and crime. It follows that interven designed to address those factors through impr parenting skills, enriched early education and impr physical and mental health could lead to large reduc in future crime and delinquency;

(b) Community development. Ever since pioneering work of Shaw and McKay[1] in Chi criminologists have recognized that powerful forc local communities can promote or inhibit crime important strand of preventive work therefore consi efforts to strengthen the economic viability and cohesiveness of local communities, to provide more services and facilities for community enhanceme strengthen residents' ties to their local communiti teach young people about the importance of the rule and to develop local police-community relations. Sus efforts along those lines have recently been made in Western countries, most notably in France Bonnemaison initiatives), the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland ("safer city" program Italy (the anti-Mafia education of young peop Palermo) and the United States of America (neighbou watch and community policing);

(c) Social development. This is the least adv of the four approaches, but is of great interest in a U Nations context. It proceeds on the assumption t developing countries and countries with econom transition much crime results from poverty, lack o employment, poor education, discrimination and a v of other social and economic deprivations. It is as that social development will remove these "caus crime. Unfortunately, there is no direct relati between social conditions and crime. Thus, crim unexpectedly increased in Western countries in ti increased affluence and improved social security also shows no direct relationship to levels of emplo in Western countries. However, these findings m hold for developing countries and countries economies in transition, where the general soci economic conditions are much less favourable;

(d) Situational crime prevention. Unlike the three other forms of crime prevention, all of which seek to reduce the motivation for crime, situational prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for crime. This has been the fastest growing variety of crime prevention in the past 20 years. It has come to be associated with the spectacular rise of private policing and the private security industry in Western countries during that period.[2] In its government-sponsored forms it consists of crime prevention advertising campaigns, efforts to influence city planning and architectural design to promote a crime-free environment, focused efforts to diagnose and remove opportunities for highly specific forms of crime such as bank robbery or residential burglary and, more recently, putting pressure on business and industry to alter products and practices giving rise to crime.

6. A large number of successes of situational prevention have been documented,[3] many of which show that crime is not merely displaced by situational prevention. This form of prevention is now part of official crime control policy in several European countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. Even so, worries continue to be expressed about the wider consequences for society of pursuing this approach to prevention, in terms of erosion of freedom and of unequal access to crime prevention benefits.

7. In the present paper, a brief review of the current status of these approaches is undertaken followed by a discussion of the likely direction of future developments in the face of current needs and future challenges. Special attention will be given to implementation difficulties, ethical considerations and the need for research and evaluation.

II. Current status of crime prevention

8. It is only during the past 20 years that Governments have devoted serious attention to crime prevention and that it has become a subject for concentrated academic study. Even so, remarkable progress has been made, namely:

(a) National crime prevention councils and agencies (directly or indirectly supported by government) have been established in many countries, including most of those in western Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States;

(b) Many community crime prevention programmes have been implemented with government support in developed countries. Sometimes this has been in the form of demonstration projects, such as the safer cities initiatives in the United Kingdom, and sometimes in the form of generally available programmes such as neighbourhood watch in the United States and the Bonnemaison community development approach in France;

(c) These crime prevention programmes have had a direct and visible effect on many aspects of people's everyday lives. Examples would include the adoption of "defensible space" architecture in public housing (which has contributed to the demolition of high-rise public housing) and the widespread adoption of closed-circuit television surveillance in town centres;

(d) Criminologists have greatly expanded writing and research on crime prevention, as a result of which our knowledge of the subject is much greater than it was 20 years ago. Many new concepts assisting with the design, implementation and evaluation of crime prevention programmes have been developed;

(e) A large number of evaluations, in particular of situational prevention, have been published. Many of these evaluations show tangible and sometimes dramatic reductions in crime;

(f) The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, a not-for-profit non-governmental organization, has been established in Montreal with support from a small consortium of countries. It runs a Best Practice Bureau, which identifies, compiles and disseminates information on successful crime prevention.[4]

III. New challenges

9. Despite the considerable progress of the past 20 years, many challenges lie ahead in developing the full potential of crime prevention. Some of the challenges result from unresolved ethical issues, implementation problems and technical difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of crime prevention, which will be discussed separately. In this section challenges resulting from two main sources are identified: (a) the uneven development of crime prevention and (b) the broad social, economic and technological changes that are altering the nature of crime. These challenges can be briefly stated as follows:

(a) In an era of "small government" marked by continual pressure to reduce government expenditure, the additional resources needed for crime prevention are

difficult to find. Officials are reluctant to reassign existing criminal justice system resources to new crime prevention programmes, in particular when the effectiveness of these is in doubt. Even in countries where crime prevention is now an established component of criminal policy, the resources devoted to it are tiny compared with those devoted to the criminal justice system;

(b) As mentioned previously, the theory and practice of the main forms of crime prevention are unequally developed. The most difficult challenge will be finding the resources to support research on crime prevention through social development, given that this form of prevention is of greatest interest to developing countries and countries with economies in transition;

(c) Crime prevention is a concept recognized primarily in the developed world, but not all developed countries have yet recognized its potential. This situation is likely to change as the result of the wider dissemination of information about the theory and practice of crime prevention. The transfer of knowledge about crime prevention from the more to the less developed world presents a greater challenge. It is likely that situational prevention can be adapted successfully to conditions in the developing world. However, it is unclear whether the same can be said of child development and community crime prevention approaches, since these depend on a social infrastructure that may not exist in developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Furthermore, it is unclear how technical assistance about crime prevention can be delivered from the more developed to the less developed parts of the world;

(d) To date, most crime prevention efforts have been focused on traditional forms of crime, which provide the bulk of the official crime statistics—predatory property crimes, assaults, domestic violence and vandalism. It is unclear whether the preventive approaches developed to date can be applied more widely to other kinds of crime. One significant group of these (discussed in section IV below) includes organized and transnational crimes, but there are many other crimes that have received little preventive attention. These include child pornography, corruption, fraud and economic crimes, hate crimes and crimes against migrants and tourists;

(e) It is also unclear whether the crime prevention approaches developed to date can be effectively applied to prevent completely new forms of crime, such as those associated with the Internet;

(f) This also holds true for the prev terrorism, a form of crime that often combines el violence with propaganda, politics and warfare. grey zone between violent crime and the crime o violence, which has only recently received attention.[5]

IV. The challenge of preventing organized crime

10. Organized crime, whether national or tran is widely perceived as a growing threat to civ Many transnational crimes, such as drug-tr trafficking in humans and money-laundering, c particular threat to developing countries and cou economies in transition. These crimes seem increase with increased globalization and, associated increase in international trade, the exp business and leisure travel and the greater e political borders.

11. It is also widely recognized that traditiona enforcement responses to organized crime canno alone and must be combined with prevention. T for International Crime Prevention, in its role dinating the preparation of the draft United Convention against Transnational Organized C acknowledged that prevention is a core eleme strategy (see articles 22 and 22 *bis*). Further, it stood that not every Member State will be in a p implement the Convention fully without techn tance from the United Nations. It is acknowle only with this three-part strategy—legal respons tion and technical assistance—can Member St both nationally and internationally to curb the transnational organized crime.

12. Opinion and techniques vary on how t organized crime. To the extent that it thrives vantage, social development, community develop child development may all have a part to play i tion. The programme developed in Palermo t people about the dangers of organized criminal one example. However, disadvantage is not t understanding organized crime. Rather, the key s that in every society, developed or not, illeg tunities abound to make large sums of money. opportunities which permit organized crime to f

13. This being the case, the greatest preventive potential may rest in the situational approach, but it must be adapted to deal with the more planned, complex offences characteristic of organized crime. This will demand detailed research on the different forms of organized crime. Such research must identify the sequence of tasks involved in committing each form of organized crime and must describe in detail how each task is accomplished. It may turn out that the apparent complexity of organized crime lies in the sequencing of tasks rather than in the nature of the tasks themselves. Such research will clarify the "opportunity structure" for each crime and at the same time will suggest opportunity-blocking measures appropriate to each stage of the crime. Little research of this kind has been conducted, but many descriptions can be found in the literature of the opportunity structure for different forms of organized crime.

14. In addition, many examples exist of situational measures that are in use or have been proposed for use against organized crime. These include:

(a) The installation of electronic tracking devices in trucks, which wiped out organized thefts of trucks in Rogers County, Oklahoma, United States. Similar devices are being installed in cargo ships operating in south-east Asia to prevent piracy;

(b) Restrictions on the international dialling capability of public pay phones in a New York City bus terminal, which eliminated a multimillion-dollar organized telephone fraud business;

(c) A variety of security changes introduced by credit card companies in the United Kingdom, which saved millions of pounds in organized credit card fraud in the 1980s and 1990s;

(d) Changes made in the 1980s in the design of customs forms, which substantially increased the difficulty of importing stolen motor vehicles into the United Kingdom;

(e) The routine employment of certified investigative accounting firms to supervise the administration of contracts in the construction industry, which was proposed as a significant opportunity-blocking reform by the New York State Task Force on Organized Crime;

(f) The increased regulation of bank secrecy, which was identified in a recent United Nations report as an important route to reducing opportunities for illegal money-laundering.

V. New preventive concepts, strategies and techniques

15. The increased attention being paid by Governments to child development is a change of considerable significance. Equally significant is that international bodies, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, are increasingly recognizing that the rule of law must precede economic and social progress. This could ultimately result in more international resources being channelled into crime prevention through social development. These developments aside, most of the recent innovations in crime prevention have been in situational and community approaches. In fact, such approaches have developed so rapidly that it is difficult to draw the line between what is new and what is not. In any case, space permits the mention of only the most significant new concepts, strategies and techniques in the fields of community development and situational prevention.

A. Community development

16. The topic of community involvement in crime prevention will be covered comprehensively during the Tenth Congress in its workshop on community involvement in crime prevention. The most significant point is that there is now widespread recognition of the need for partnerships or multi-agency cooperation in community crime prevention.

17. Experience in a variety of contexts has shown that those partnerships cannot be sustained without a full-time coordinator. This need has been met in a variety of ways. For example, some central government community development demonstration projects have included funds for a local coordinator. Where a longer-term investment in community development is contemplated, a choice has had to be made between vesting leadership in the police or in the local municipal authority. Further, it is understood that effective community development requires partnerships to be formed not only between police and local government, but also with local business interests.[5]

B. Situational crime prevention

18. Because of the concentrated injection of resources by countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, much progress has been made recently in the theory and

practice of situational crime prevention. Crime opportunity theory has made many advances in the past decade, especially in the form of routine activities theory and rational choice theory.[7] Some important new theoretical insights have been produced concerning the interaction of so-called root causes of crime (such as social deprivation, discrimination and inadequate parenting) and immediate situational opportunities in producing crime. New concepts, such as "repeat victimization", referring to the tendency for crime to be repeatedly visited on a small proportion of the total population,[8] and "hot spots", referring to the tendency for crime to be tightly clustered in particular places, have helped to focus situational prevention where it is likely to be most effective. Finally, considerable progress has been made in developing classifications and case studies of effective means of reducing crime opportunities.

VI. Implementation difficulties

19. Implementation difficulties are broadly of two kinds: (a) difficulties in persuading people to agree to the necessary measures; and (b) difficulties in getting agreed-upon measures implemented correctly. These difficulties are encountered in all forms of crime prevention and are often related to disputes about the ethical basis of the measures (see below). In community development, as mentioned above, most efforts to date have been focused on the second kind of implementation difficulty, achieving the necessary coordination among local agencies to implement agreed-upon measures. The more difficult problem of launching community development initiatives in the most distressed neighbourhoods, which lack human resources and basic organizational capacity, has been largely avoided. In social development, the implementation difficulties are presently focused on obtaining agreement about the necessity and feasibility of this approach to crime prevention. Subsequently, the issue of obtaining the needed resources will have to be faced. In child development, the controversies involve resource procurement and the ways in which crime prevention goals should be combined with the other goals of child development.

20. In situational prevention, both kinds of implementation difficulties have been widely encountered. For instance, various efforts to introduce gun controls in the United States, designed to reduce the opportunity for lethal violence, are currently being resisted by the National Rifle Association and other members of the so-called gun lobby. At the other end of the spectrum of seriousness, managers of apartment buildings often find that their security measures are defeated by residents who dislike the inconvenience of having to lock building entrances every time they go in or out.

21. As situational prevention becomes more focused on achieving change in practices and products of business and industry that generate crime, it seems likely to encounter resistance on grounds of cost. For example, retail stores often resist advice about ways to reduce shoplifting because those methods also discourage impulse purchases. Insurance companies may resist suggestions about tightening up procedures to check on fraudulent claims because checking costs them more than simply paying all claims with the minimum of checking. Vehicle manufacturers resist consumer group pressure to improve the security of cars on the grounds that there is little public demand for increased security. Ways of overcoming these barriers to effective situational prevention are likely to be the focus of considerable discussion in the next phase in the development of situational prevention.

VII. Ethical issues, rights and responsibilities

22. Most of the ethical concerns expressed about crime prevention have been related to the situational approach rather than to the other approaches discussed here. This is because situational prevention seeks not to reduce criminal motivation, but to reduce opportunities for crime. It is therefore seen as a fundamentally more repressive approach than the others, and critics claim that the use of situational measures has many harmful consequences for society. These threats have been identified as follows:

(a) The use of target-hardening and access-control measures will lead to the development of a "fortress society" in which people terrified of crime and distrustful of others barricade themselves in their homes. This will lead to the growing alienation of the population and the gradual destruction of community life;

(b) The use of closed-circuit television and other electronic means of surveillance fosters the development of authoritarian, pervasive forms of social control and will result in the erosion of important civil liberties;

(c) The increased use of security guards and private policing leads to the social exclusion of the homeless, minorities and unemployed young people from

public places such as shopping malls, parks and entertainment facilities;

(d) The increased use of security devices leads to the regimentation of society and means that law-abiding citizens are forced to endure irksome and inconvenient precautions such as security checks at building entrances and the loss of luggage storage facilities;

(e) The insistence that members of the public take precautions to protect themselves from crime results in crime victims' being blamed for their own misfortune. It also results in women's enduring significant restrictions on going out at night and travelling alone;

(f) Because situational prevention can be expensive, it can result in crime being displaced from the rich, who can afford to take protective measures, to the poor, who cannot afford to do so. It can also result in less serious forms of crime being replaced by more violent crime as offenders compensate for the increased difficulties they face.

23. These criticisms have not gone unanswered.[9] It has been argued, for example, that crime prevention through environmental design encourages natural surveillance by local residents of the streets and public areas around their homes and can promote community cohesion. Surveys have consistently shown that the public generally welcomes the surveillance of public spaces through closed-circuit television. Most people welcome information about routine precautions they can take to protect themselves from crime. Many publicly funded situational prevention measures have been used to bring down unacceptably high rates of crime in poor and deprived neighbourhoods.

24. However reasonable these and other defences may be, it is clear that the ethics of situational prevention will continue to be debated. Increasing experience of the other crime prevention approaches will most probably also result in ethical challenges. For instance, child development approaches are sometimes accused, on the one hand, of unfairly labelling as delinquent those singled out for special treatment and, on the other, of rewarding the least deserving members of the community. Community development projects are also often the butt of accusations of either preferential treatment or stigmatization of residents.

25. However, these and other social and ethical costs of crime prevention have to be weighed against the potential benefits of reducing the burden of crime on society and reducing the harm that befalls individual people as a result of victimization. The costs of prevention must also be compared with the human and social costs of the criminal justice system, which, despite the best efforts of jurists, parliamentarians and officials, continues to be intrusive and inequitable in its consequences.

26. Ethical concerns have been addressed in United Nations efforts to establish international principles for the implementation of crime prevention, most recently through the convening of an expert group meeting in Buenos Aires (8-10 September 1999) to consider elements of responsible crime prevention. The resulting draft guidelines (see annex), which build on those appearing in the annex to Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/33, propose that in their crime prevention plans Member States take account of the main international instruments related to human rights and crime prevention, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Assembly resolution 44/25, annex), the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (resolution 48/104), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines) (resolution 45/112, annex), as well as the draft Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and the draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

VIII. Evaluation of crime prevention

27. Without evaluation, crime prevention practices cannot be improved and, without hard evidence about effectiveness, reliable information about best practices cannot be disseminated. These points have been emphasized in a variety of national and international strategy documents concerned with crime prevention. Unfortunately, considerable difficulties stand in the way of rigorous evaluation. These difficulties can be divided into resource limitations and technical problems.

28. One resource limitation is that the detailed crime data needed for measuring the outcome of crime prevention measures are frequently not available because statistical record-keeping is deficient. A second important resource limitation is the lack of trained personnel who are competent to undertake evaluation studies. This is not a problem only for developing countries and countries with economies in transition, but also for those developed countries without a strong tradition of quantitative research in the social sciences. In short supply everywhere is expertise in undertaking cost-benefit evaluations.

29. The different approaches to crime prevention cannot all be evaluated in the same way, and the technical problems encountered vary considerably with each approach. Social development approaches can be evaluated only using econometric techniques that compare crime rates before and after the implementation of development programmes or that compare countries at different levels of economic and social development. Evaluations of child development approaches, unlike the other crime prevention approaches, can in theory make use of rigorous experimental designs. However, randomly dividing children between treatment and control groups raises ethical and practical difficulties. In addition, it is difficult to measure long-term reductions in delinquency and crime through a child development approach. In evaluating community development, two main difficulties are encountered: (a) because a package of measures is usually implemented, it may be impossible to identify which of the measures, if any, is principally responsible for success and (b) because a number of objectives are often sought by the different partners, it may not always be possible to measure outcomes in ways that meet each partner's concerns.

30. Situational crime prevention techniques have been subjected to the greatest number of separate evaluations—more than 100 to date. In one respect, the effects of situational prevention are easier to measure. This is because reductions are sought in highly specific forms of crime and, if the measures are effective, those reductions should become apparent immediately.

31. It is rarely possible to conduct true experiments when evaluating situational prevention, and most evaluations of this approach rely on weaker time series or quasi-experimental designs. This makes it difficult to know for sure whether any reductions in crime are due to the preventive measures implemented. One solution to this problem may lie in the much clearer specification of the mechanisms by which the situational prevention measures achieve their effect on crime. Evaluations would then be as much focused on the process of implementing measures as on the results of the measures.[10]

32. A second general difficulty in evaluating situational prevention is that there is always the possibility that situational measures have led to crime's being merely displaced, not reduced. In fact, most evaluations to date have found rather little evidence of displacement.[11] In a review conducted for the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, Hesseling reported that in only 33 out of 55 situational prevention projects was there any sign of displacement.[12] Furthermore, in none of the 33 studies was displacement complete. Instead, some crime prevention benefits were obtained in every case.

33. This work on displacement has led to the discovery of the phenomenon of "diffusion of benefits". This term refers to the fact that situational prevention often results in reductions not just in the crimes targeted by the measures, but also in crimes that have not been targeted.[13] It seems that potential offenders often overestimate the power or the reach of the measures that have been taken. Designing evaluations that simultaneously measure both possible displacement and diffusion of benefits will present significant technical challenges to the academic community.

34. Already a sufficient number of evaluations of crime prevention measures have been reported, so that meta-analyses (in which the results of separate evaluations are systematically compared within a common framework) can be undertaken.[3] This kind of comparison is important because individual studies do not always point in the same direction. This fact permits unsound preventive approaches to survive longer than they should. Meta-evaluations provide a methodology for taking account of small inconsistencies between studies to reach the most reliable conclusions about the effectiveness of particular approaches. As more crime prevention projects are subjected to evaluation, meta-evaluations will become increasingly feasible and will play an increasing part in the development of crime prevention policy.

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Annex

Revised draft elements of responsible crime prevention, prepared by the Expert Group Meeting on Elements of Responsible Crime Prevention: Addressing Traditional and Emerging Crime Problems, held in Buenos Aires from 8 to 10 September 1999

I. The concept of crime prevention

1. Crime prevention, for the purpose of these revised draft elements of responsible crime prevention, refers to strategies and initiatives that seek to promote safety and security and that do not resort to formal criminal justice sanctions.

2. Crime prevention should address all forms of crime, violence, victimization and insecurity and take into account the growing internationalization of criminal activities.

3. Crime prevention is subdivided into approaches focusing on potential offenders, potential victims and situations. Crime prevention consists of: (a) primary prevention, which typically targets the social factors and psychological problems that predispose persons to offending and/or victimization; (b) secondary prevention, which includes measures directed at persons at risk of becoming offenders and/or victims; and (c) tertiary prevention, which involves measures to prevent recidivism among former offenders through social reintegration and/or treatment, as well as services to support victims.

II. Promoting and sustaining responsible crime prevention

A. Basic principles

4. Governments should play a leadership role in the promotion of safer communities through the creation and maintenance of a national strategy that acknowledges crime prevention as an essential component of social development.

5. Crime prevention strategies at the national, regional and local levels should be characterized by a multisectoral approach that includes members of the community as integral and essential partners in all stages of the planning and implementation of a crime prevention programme and that respects different social realities, cultures and genders.

6. Crime prevention strategies at the national, regional and local levels should address the root causes and risk factors of crime and victimization through social, economic, health and educational policies. Where appropriate, crime prevention programmes should be linked to comprehensive programmes addressing social marginalization and exclusion, with particular emphasis on families and children at risk. Crime prevention strategies targeting groups at risk of becoming offenders, especially youth, should be promoted and should include educational opportunities, employment, housing and leisure facilities.

7. The prevention of crime and violence and the promotion of community safety should be a horizontal priority in the planning and management of cities.

8. Governments should strive to achieve sustainability of their crime prevention strategies through consideration of the following means: assessment of the distribution of resources between crime prevention and the other elements of the criminal justice system with a view to encouraging adequate resources for effective and timely prevention of crime and victimization; clear accountability for funding, programming and coordinating crime prevention initiatives; and the encouragement of community involvement in sustainability.

9. Partners in the implementation of prevention programmes, including law enforcement and health professionals, should have clearly defined and transparent roles.

10. Law should define the limits within which the private security sector may act. The private security sector should, in accordance with human rights standards, not exercise any function that, by its nature, is incompatible with the rule of law and the principle that the use of force is reserved for the State.

11. The development of national crime prevention strategies should foster commonalities between local and global crime prevention objectives.

12. Under all circumstances, crime prevention measures should be carried out in strict conformity with the relevant provisions of international law and international standards of human rights.

B. Tools and methodologies

13. Governments should establish special councils or other agencies specifically mandated to exercise the necessary leadership to draw up plans of action that define priorities, establish linkages and coordinate with relevant ministries, foster partnerships with non-governmental organizations and the business, private and professional sectors at the national, regional and local levels and develop and provide the tools necessary for communities to address crime problems.

14. A national crime prevention strategy should possess the capacity to identify trends and risk factors and be forward-looking by encouraging the development of early-warning systems and/or indicators that Governments might use to better anticipate various forms of criminality, taking into account both their local and their global dimensions.

15. Crime prevention strategies should encourage the development of the following: rigorous diagnosis, an action plan, an implementation strategy and an evaluation of effectiveness. These steps should involve multiple sectors and key partners of the community, including the citizens, with a view to establishing a coalition that is capable of exercising strong leadership and that draws upon the most promising practices.

16. To promote prevention, provisions should be made available or strengthened for a range of mechanisms for mediation and informal conflict resolution.

17. Situational crime prevention programmes should be developed, including target-hardening, environmental design and surveillance. These programmes should not unduly reduce the quality of the built environment or limit free access to the public domain or public facilities, nor should they infringe on personal privacy.

18. Crime prevention strategies should contain a dynamic public education and awareness-building component that addresses the following: the provision of information

concerning effective strategies and techniques to relevant actors; the active engagement of the community in all aspects of the strategy; the accurate presentation of the crime problem and effective ways to respond to it, including measures that citizens can take to assist in the strategy; and the building of confidence in the formal institutions that make up the criminal justice system.

19. The strategy should ensure that crime prevention interventions are evaluated. Evaluations should consider not just the effects on crime but also wider benefits, such as a reduction in fear or improved confidence among stakeholders in problem-solving processes. Possible costs of the intervention should also be assessed, such as the displacement of crime or potential infringements of privacy and liberty. For promising interventions, evaluations should seek to identify ways to improve them and, through cost-effective assessments, suggest measures to sustain them.

III. International cooperation

20. Member States, in creating an international crime prevention framework, should set out meaningful, achievable and concrete tasks that take into account the main international instruments related to human rights and crime prevention, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Assembly resolution 44/25, annex), the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (resolution 48/104), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Ryadh Guidelines) (resolution 45/112, annex), as well as the draft Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and the draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

21. The strategy should be consistent and supportive of other relevant United Nations norms and standards in crime prevention and criminal justice.

22. The international exchange of information on the most promising practices, in terms of both effectiveness and respect for human rights, should be facilitated.

23. Technical assistance to Governments for the development and implementation of effective crime prevention and community safety strategies at the national, regional and local levels should be provided in accordance with the above-mentioned norms and standards.